We present evidence on the role of hedge funds in the price formation process by using data on hedge fund equity ownership. Compared to other institutional investors, hedge funds tend to hold stocks that plot above the security market plane and stocks with larger deviations from model values in the cross-section. Focusing on the set of stocks plotting above the security market plane, we find that an increase of hedge fund ownership is significantly related to subsequent reduction in the stock's deviation from model values. Overall, these findings suggest that hedge funds play a role in reducing asset mispricing.
Introduction
The industrial organization of investment has gradually shifted over the past 30 years to a predominantly institutional one. A distinctive feature of this shift has been the emergence of hedge funds as intermediaries in the publicly traded securities markets. While speculation is as old as stock markets and neo-classical asset pricing models presume the existence of active traders in equilibrium, the change in the way speculation is organized represents a potentially important shift in the enforcement of market efficiency. For example, the emergence of hedge funds as large-scale enterprises has enabled innovation in information processing and trading technologies. Large funds can afford high fixed costs of investment in research, data, trading platforms and regulatory compliance. Similarly, organizational changes due to the agency relationship have engendered the need for performance using standard statistical measures, making the use of alphas, Sharpe ratios and other metrics ubiquitous. Finally, the broad acceptance of quantitative asset pricing models based on factor exposures and security characteristics has led to a common, conceptual framework of relative valuation.
In this paper, we focus on this last point. Given the prevalence of risk-based asset pricing models in academic research and practice, we should expect to find at least some speculative entities engaged in relative-value arbitrage. That is, trading securities based on their price deviation from assets of similar risk characteristics. Relative value arbitrage -or the potential for it -is at the foundation of neo-classical asset pricing models such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (c.f. Ross, 1976) . Modifications of the theory point out that agency and funding frictions limit the capacity of hedge funds to enforce the law of one price and make predictions about the conditions that limit arbitrageurs (c.f. Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 ). An extensive theoretical literature has developed to analyze the institutional conditions that affect the limits of arbitrage, and to study welfare and policy implications of these limits. Considerable financial theory has focused on the role of arbitrageurs as liquidity providers and modeled how financial constraints impede this function. 1 Neo-classical asset pricing theory has been regularly applied in practice. Grinold and Kahn (1999) for example, develop an approach to active portfolio management based on the information ratio: the expected ratio of alpha to its tracking error. 2 Their framework makes several general predictions about active manager behavior. Managers seeking to add alpha will increase their probability of doing so by (1) taking positions in proportion to the information ratio, (2) increasing the breadth of their positive alpha holdings to diversify risk, (3) holding long-short portfolios that eliminate benchmark risk, and offset the market positive exposure of their long positions by the negative market exposure of their short position, and (4) incorporate costs and frictions (such as the cost of information acquisition).
While many institutional investors may use this framework for active investing most have goals other than simply maximizing alpha. Long-only equity managers, for example, supply positive exposure to market factors in addition to seeking superior risk-adjusted returns. Other types of managers face institutional constraints aimed at maintaining a consistent exposure to a given market factor. Hedge funds, at least in theory, are less constrained to deliver factor exposures, are able to take short positions, and are evaluated on their alpha. As such, we would expect them to conform more closely to the predictions of Grinold and Kahn.
The empirical literature has thus far tested relatively few theoretical predictions about the behavior of arbitrageurs. Up to this point, empirical researchers have not been able to comprehensively study the activities of hedge funds in the markets except in specialized circumstances and on limited datasets. In recent years, however, these barriers to research have declined. While hedge funds are often described as lightly-regulated, opaque investment vehicles it turns out that, with some serious effort, it is possible to gather considerable information about their securities holding and trading activities, albeit with a temporal lag. 3 The institutionalization of speculation has brought hedge funds increasingly into the regulatory fold and mandated the quarterly disclosure of holdings for funds above a certain size threshold.
While it remains difficult to comprehensively observe their short-sales positions, a large fraction of quarterly long positions for major funds can be studied. 4 In this paper we assemble an extensive database of hedge fund equity holdings from 13F filings and use it to examine the evolving role of hedge funds in asset pricing. Our analysis includes information on virtually all of the major hedge funds that hold and trade U.S. equities. 5 This is important, given that we are interested not only in the funds' behavior but in their potential market impact.
We use this data to pose the question of whether hedge funds -and the assets they tradebehave as neo-classical theory predicts. Do hedge funds take positions in stocks that deviate from the pricing model; i.e. in a multi-factor world, the security market plane? Once they take a position in a stock does its price converge to model value? In short, do hedge funds function as enforcers of relative-value market efficiency? The limits of arbitrage literature likewise provides testable hypotheses to take to this data. Do deviations from the security market plane persist despite the action of hedge funds? Is mispricing associated with reduced hedge fund activity and shocks to funding liquidity?
Background
Some recent evidence on the trading behavior of hedge funds suggests a potentially significant role in price formation. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) collect 13F filings for 56 3 This lag and its strategic implications is explored in Brown and Schwarz (2011) 4 Derivatives position data are also available. Aragon and Martin (2010) and Zuckerman (2011) make use of hedge fund put and call positions. 5 Fung and Hsieh (2011) highlight the challenges of identifying some very large funds which do not report to standard databases. This requires augmenting automated search processes with significant amount of handcollecting of information.
hedge fund management companies and find hedge funds made money by chasing returns during the tech bubble period. Their evidence is consistent with hedge funds exacerbating the mispricing of securities. Griffin and Xu (2009) study hedge-fund managers' stock selection ability using a larger sample of 306 hedge fund companies and find modest evidence of stock selection ability. In a recent work, Griffin, Harris, Shu and Topaloglu (2011) find evidence more consistent with destabilization the market during the tech bubble period. Several empirical studies have documented that hedge fund play an important microstructure role. 6 These studies
show that hedge funds seem to affect the price formation process.
Our paper differs from prior hedge fund/asset pricing studies in that we focus on mispricing relative to a factor model and examine the question of whether hedge funds play a role in convergence to that model. In particular, we study the institutional behavior with respect to the set of stocks that are "undervalued" (i.e. stocks with positive historic alphas with respect to the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model). We find that hedge fund holdings and purchases of these undervalued securities are positively related to the degree of mispricing as well as to the residual variance. This not true for non-hedge fund institutions.
Next we follow the subsequent price behavior of undervalued stocks purchased and held by hedge funds vs. non-hedge fund institutions. We find that mispricing and residual variance both decline for stocks held or purchased by hedge funds, but this is not the case for non-hedge fund institutions. Finally, using the full sample of stocks with 13F holding data, we show that an increase in hedge fund ownership is informative and predicts future stock returns positively in the horizon of up to one quarter, consistent with the hypothesis that hedge fund managers possess skill. This finding is also consistent with the limits to arbitrage hypothesis which predicts 6 Choi, Getmansky, Henderson and Tookes (2010) study convertible bond arbitrageurs as capital suppliers, Aragon and Strahan (2012) , use the Lehman failure as an event to study shocks to hedge fund liquidity and consequent security price dynamics. Jylhä, Rinne and Suominen (2012) study short-term price reversals as a measure of market liquidity and conclude that hedge funds in the equity markets function as "immediacy" providers. Hong and Jiang (2011) find that stock return dynamics around institutional purchases and sales by clienteles including hedge funds are consistent with binding short-sale constraints and mispricing.
delayed convergence despite activities by hedge funds. On the other hand, the changes in holdings of other types of institutional investors do not forecast future stock returns.
Taken together, our findings suggest that hedge-fund trading may play a role in enforcing efficiency, but that the convergence to the security market plane is not instantaneous, and may extend over a quarter or more. The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the data collection process of hedge fund ownership data and provides summary statistics of our hedge fund management company sample. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Data
This paper represents a major data collection effort. Following the approach of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009), we compile a comprehensive dataset of hedge fund equity ownership. Our goal is to collect a comprehensive sample, despite the challenge that all extant databases of hedge funds rely on self-reporting. Matching management companies in hedge fund databases and 13F filings is non-trivial. Our final sample of hedge fund ownership data includes a universe of 1,356 hedge fund management companies which together manage more than 5,071 funds and spans the period from 1981 through 2009 (Note:
5,071 funds is a lower bound because fund level info is only available when a HF company is in one of the five hedge fund databases we used). It covers substantially all the major hedge funds trading in the U.S. market.
Hedge Fund Identification
The starting point for identifying all hedge fund firms is to match management company definition of what constitutes a hedge fund. In our approach, we define a hedge fund as an investment company included in a hedge fund database, a firm that identifies itself as a hedge fund, or a firm that has a specific threshold of high-net-worth investors and a substantial fraction of performance compensation.
After compiling a master list of hedge fund management companies from various hedge fund databases, we match them with institutional investors in the 13F holding data. One difficulty is that a hedge fund manager may not appear in any of hedge fund databases because reporting to a hedge fund database is voluntary. 7 Another difficulty is that the name of a hedge fund (or a hedge fund company) may not be the same in different databases. This required manually checking unmatched investment advisers and money managers from the 13F data to determine whether they are hedge fund management companies (or sponsors), using a variety of online resources. This procedure yields a sample of 1,582 institutions of potential hedge fund companies. The sample also contains investment advisers who manage hedge funds, but whose main business is mutual fund management or investment banking.
To ensure the primary business of an institutional investor is operating a hedge fund, we adopt the approach of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009) 
Equity Data
We merge the 13F institutional holdings data with CRSP and COMPUSTAT and include only common shares listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We obtain daily stock returns from CRSP and accounting data from the merged CRSP/COMPUSTAT quarterly industrial file.
In each quarter all the stocks included must have more than 30 non-missing daily return for the previous three month, non-missing market capitalization at the end of the previous quarter, and non-negative book value of common equity. We also delete the last quarter of data for any firm delisted before our sample period ends. As is commonly done with COMPUSTAT data, we winsorize the firm-quarter panel data at both the upper and lower 2.5% levels to mitigate the impacts of outliers. Our merged panel data contains 389,982 firm-quarter observations over the period of 1981 through 2009. 
Summary Statistics

The Evolution of Hedge Fund Demand for Stock Characteristics
Based on merged CRSP, COMPUSTAT and 13F institutional holding data (the full sample), Table 2 reports the stock characteristics at the firm-quarter panel level for the full sample of all stocks reported in 13F filings over the period (Panel A), and for a sub-sample of stocks within the top decile of hedge-fund ownership in each quarter (Panel B). The characteristics include book to market, size, dividend yield, age, price, S&P membership, average four factor alpha, t-value of the stock (similar to an information ratio used in practice)
and average R-square.
The average book-to-market ratio is 0.68 with a median of 0.58 for the full sample, which is similar to the average book-to-market ratio of 0.64 for stocks with high hedge fund ownership. 
Empirical Results
In or analysis, we test whether hedge funds hold undervalued stocks, and whether their behavior in this regard differs from that of other institutional investors. We also examine whether hedge funds purchase stocks that deviate significantly from the security market plane in general, and whether this behavior differs from that of other institutions. Next we examine whether hedge fund holdings and change in holdings is associated with convergence of stock returns to the security market plane and the temporal characteristics of this convergence.
Estimation of a Factor Model
We first estimate a linear factor model to determine whether a stock is undervalued with respect to the security market plane in each quarter in the sample period. We calculate alpha from the Fama-French-Carhart (see Carhart (1997) ) four-factor model, and we estimate alpha for each stock in each quarter using daily returns:
where r i,τ is the excess return on stock i on day τ, MKTτ is the value-weighted market excess return, and SMBτ, HMLτ, and UMDτ are the returns of the value-weighted, zero-net-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns. For simplicity, the subscript of quarter t is omitted from the above equation.
In theory, alpha is the abnormal return on a stock in excess of what would be predicted by an equilibrium model. When using the Fama-French-Carhart model as a benchmark model, alpha is the difference between a stock's return and a "fair" compensation for the stock's systematic exposures to market, a size-, a value-, and a momentum-related factor.
11 In the context of security analysis and fund management, alpha is the key variable that tells managers whether a stock is a good investment. A stock with a positive alpha provides a premium over the premium it derives from its tendency to track benchmark factors, suggesting that the stock is undervalued and offers an attractive expected return. For a fund manager who invests in multiple stocks, the alpha of the fund is the weighted average of alphas of underlying individual stocks.
Positive Alpha Shares
The first question we address is whether hedge funds as a group tend to hold (or purchase) stocks that plot above the security market plane to a greater extent than other institutional investors. As we note above, an active manager seeking to generate a positive alpha portfolio 11 We are grateful to Kenneth French for making the data on the four factors available for download from his website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
will take a broad set of offsetting long and short positions for which he or she has been able to form a reliable expectation (i.e. high information ratio) of future positive alpha. In our analysis, we assume that this expectation process relies in part on past positive alphas (i.e. plotting about the security market plane). Although many variables will go into the hedge fund manager's models -including fundamental ratios, news, industry analysis and so forth, our tests focus on the simple metric of past mispricing.
As pointed out above without comprehensive information about short sales, a test of whether hedge funds take short positions in stocks with negative alphas and positive positions in positive alpha stocks is severely attenuated by the censored data problem under the alternative.
All of the short positions relying on negative expected alphas are missing from the sample. A Tobit specification to address this censoring problem requires a model of censoring.
Because of the censoring issue, we focus in the remaining analysis on the part of the distribution which is less subject to the attenuation: the stocks with the highest historical alphas.
In particular, we compare holdings of undervalued stocks of hedge funds with that of non-hedge fund institutions. If hedge funds pursue arbitrage strategies and explore mispricing in security markets, their holdings (long positions) of undervalued stocks should be disproportionally large in comparison to holdings of other types of institutions (e.g., banks or mutual funds) whose investment objective is not absolute returns.
A stock is defined as an undervalued stock, or a positive alpha stock in quarter t, if its alpha in quarter t is positive and significant at the 5% level. (2) where I t is the number of positive alpha stocks and J t is the number of hedge fund companies in quarter t. For non-hedge fund institutions, a positive alpha share is defined similarly.
We perform a t-test of the difference in average positive alpha shares between hedge funds and non-hedge fund institutions over the time period of our study. We find that the difference in average positive alpha shares between hedge funds and non-hedge fund institutions is 0.9% and is highly significant (t-statistic=5.01). This is consistent with the proposition that hedge funds seek arbitrage opportunities by buying under-valued stocks -where undervalued is defined as plotting above the security market plane.
One potential concern is that hedge funds simply invest in stocks that plot both above and below the security market line. In fact, as we show below, hedge funds tend to invest in stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. To examine this issue, we perform the following test. For each quarter, we calculate the total investment in under-valued stock and in overvalued stocks, defined analogously as a stock with a t-value for a negative alpha of equal to and greater than 1.65. We calculate the ratio of capital in under-valued to over-valued stocks. For hedge funds, the average ratio over the sample period is 3.56. For non-hedge funds, the average ratio is 2.96.
For all institutions together, the average ratio is 2.94. As before we use this time-series to perform a paired t-test of whether hedge funds have a higher proportional investment in positive vs. negative alpha stocks compared to non-hedge funds. The test rejects the null at the 10% level (p-value = .063). Table 3 tests whether the fraction of hedge fund ownership of undervalued stocks is explained in the cross-section by deviations above the security market plane. It reports the results of an estimation of a quarter-by-quarter Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of each undervalued stock's hedge fund ownership fraction (IO_HF) and non-hedge-fund ownership fraction (IO_Non_HF) on previous-quarter's alpha. The Fama-MacBeth regression has the following specification:
Institutional Share of Undervalued Stocks
where IO i,t is hedge fund holdings (or, non-hedge fund holdings) measured by percentage of share held in stock i in quarter t, Alpha i,t-1 is the measure of under-valuation from the FamaFrench-Carhart model for stock i in quarter t-1, and X i,t-1 is a vector of stock characteristics, for stock i in quarter t-1.
We include control variables of lagged stock characteristics including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, share price, and a dummy variable indicating S&P 500 index membership. They have been shown to explain total institutional ownership well (see Gompers and Metrick (2001) ). Following the literature, the dependent and independent variables are standardized each quarter, using their respective means and standard deviations.
12 Because the ownership variable is measured in percent, we take the nature log for all stock characteristics variables (except for the dummy variable of S&P 500 membership) so that all variables have similar interpretations. For dividend yield (D/P), the logarithmic transformation is Ln (Dividend Yield) = Ln (1+D/P). t-statistics from the Fama-MacBeth regression are in parentheses.
In Table 3 , model (1) shows that the average coefficient on the lagged alpha is positive and significant (with t-statistic=6.09). The interpretation of this finding is that stocks with significant and larger under-valuation with respect to the four-factor model in the previous quarter are associated with a significantly higher level of hedge fund holdings in the present quarter, after controlling for stock characteristics. In contrast, we do not find a significant relationship between non-hedge fund holdings and the measure of stock under-valuation in model (2).
We test for the differences in the average coefficients on lagged Alpha between hedge funds and non-hedge funds. The p-value from this test strongly rejects the null that the average regression coefficients are the same for hedge funds and non-hedge funds. These findings support the hypothesis that hedge funds seek inefficiencies in the equity market and hold undervalued stocks. We show that other types of institutional investors including banks, insurance companies and mutual funds, in aggregate, do not pursue a similar strategy and do not play the same role as hedge funds in equity markets. Table 3 also examines the relationship between stock characteristics observed in the previous quarter and equity holdings by hedge funds in the current quarter. The coefficients on book-to-market ratio and market capitalization are positive and significant, suggesting that hedge funds tend to hold under-valued stocks with larger capitalization and higher book-to-market ratios. In addition, the coefficients on dividend yield and S&P 500 membership dummy are negative and significant. Thus, hedge funds prefer holding under-valued stocks with lower dividend yields and stocks that do not belonging to the S&P 500 index. Given the high correlation between size and S&P 500 inclusion, we may interpret the opposite signs on these variables as a contrast. In comparison, Griffin and Xu (2009) find that hedge funds tend to hold small, value, and past loser stock relatively to mutual funds.
Comparing the results in models (1) and (2) in Table 3 , we find that, relative to nonhedge fund institutions, hedge funds tend to hold small, under-valued stocks; the coefficient on market capitalization is 0.19 for hedge fund ownership and 0.53 for non-hedge fund ownership, and the difference is significant. Relative to non-hedge fund institutions, hedge funds also prefer to hold younger, under-valued stocks with lower dividend yield, lower share price, and those that do not belong to the S&P 500 index.
Idiosyncratic Volatility
Much current research on idiosyncratic risk has focused on its relationship to market efficiency. Low R-square (i.e. high proportional idiosyncratic risk) has been used as a measure of pricing efficiency (Mork, Yueng and Yu, 2000) and also as an indicator of firm-specific uncertainty (Teoh, Yang and Zhang, 2007, Hou, Xiong and Peng, 2006) . Teo et al. find that low R-square is associated with standard accounting anomalies, suggesting that the financial statements of low R-square firms are less revealing. Hou et al. find that low R-square stocks exhibit more over-reaction and price momentum consistent with price inefficiency. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that idiosyncratic volatility may be an inherent characteristic that impedes price discovery because it exposes arbitrageurs to funding risk.
Stocks with high alphas but high idiosyncratic volatility are less attractive not only because of concern over estimation error in alpha, but also because the implied arbitrage exposes the arbitrageur to residual risk that must be diversified. When positive alpha opportunities are limited, or they are all correlated within a given industry or security style, such diversification may not be achievable. Thus opportunities for arbitrage in expectation are likely to be correlated to high idiosyncratic risk. In the framework of Grinold and Kahn, the high idiosyncratic risk reduces the information ratio and thus makes the position less attractive.
The pricing efficiency interpretation, together with the Shleifer and Vishny argument, predicts that hedge funds will avoid high idiosyncratic risk stocks because they already efficiently incorporate firm-specific information, and they are also riskier to hedge. On the other hand the price inefficiency interpretation would suggest that such stocks represent potential opportunities for hedge fund investors seeking to exploit their relative analytical advantage, and that the degree to which they exploit these opportunities depends upon market frictions. 13 In other words, the high idiosyncratic risk may be indicative of the potential for mispricing and thus positive expected alpha.
In this section, we examine the cross-sectional relationship between hedge fund ownership share and idiosyncratic volatility of undervalued stocks. In each quarter, we estimate idiosyncratic risk using Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, where idiosyncratic risk is defined as the standard deviation of the time-series of daily residual terms. The regression model is estimated as follows:
where IO i,t is hedge fund holdings (or, non-hedge fund holdings) in stock i in quarter t,
Idio.Risk i,t-1 is idiosyncratic risk for stock i in quarter t-1 which is obtained by using the FamaFrench-Carhart four factor model, and X i,t-1 is a vector of stock characteristics defined in the previous section. Table 4 presents the results. For the set of undervalued stocks, we find a strong relationship between hedge fund holdings and stock's idiosyncratic volatility. The coefficient on lagged idiosyncratic volatility is significant at the 1% level (with a t-statistic of 6.28). The estimated coefficients of book-to-market ratio and market capitalization are positive and significant. For the other two control variables, dividend yield and S&P 500 membership, the coefficients are negative and significant. Regressing non-hedge fund ownership on lagged idiosyncratic volatility and control variables, we find that the coefficient on lagged idiosyncratic volatility is not significant (t-statistic = -0.01).
The p-value from a t-test shows that the average coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility for hedge funds is significantly different from that for non-hedge funds; a one standard deviation shock to idiosyncratic volatility leads to a 0.13 standard deviation increase in next-quarter hedge fund ownership in the set of undervalued stocks and no increase in non-hedge fund ownership in that set. In sum, for the set of stocks that plot above the security market plane as define above, there is a significant relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and hedge fund ownership, but such a relationship is insignificant for non-hedge funds. Our results can be interpreted as evidence in favor the price inefficiency interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility.
Regressions of Change in Hedge Fund Ownership on Alphas and Idiosyncratic Risk
Our analysis so far has focused on the level of hedge fund ownership. In this section, we investigate the relationship between changes in hedge fund ownership and mispricing. We estimate the Fama-MacBeth regression model and regress the quarter-on-quarter change in hedge fund ownership on alpha (the measure of under-valuation) from the previous quarter and control variables. Table 5 presents the estimation results from the following model:
where ΔIO i,t is the change in hedge fund ownership (or, the change in non-hedge fund ownership) from quarter t-1 to t, Alpha i,t-1 is the measure of stock under-valuation in quarter t-1, and X i,t-1 is a vector of one-quarter lagged stock characteristics. As before, in each quarter t, the crosssectional regression utilizes firm-quarter observations for which the stock is under-valued in the previous quarter and the t-statistic of Alpha i,,t-1 is equal to and greater than 1.65. Table 5 shows that, after controlling for stock characteristics, the lagged alpha is significantly associated with the change in hedge fund ownership (t-statistic = 2.44), but not with the change in non-hedge fund ownership. For hedge funds, a one standard deviation increase in under-valuation measure leads to a 0.04 standard deviation increase in the change of hedge fund ownership. This finding suggests that when stocks are underpriced, hedge funds increase their holdings of such stocks but non-hedge fund institutions do not do so. In model (1), all control variables of stock characteristics, such as book-to-market ratio and market capitalization, are not significant in this test. Thus the change in hedge fund ownership is primarily related to our measure of potential arbitrage profits, not driven by changes in stock characteristics.
Next we examine the relation between the changes in hedge fund ownership and lagged idiosyncratic volatility. Using firm-quarter observations when the t-statistic of alpha is positive and significant at the 5% level in quarter t-1, we estimate the following Fama-MacBeth regression model:
In Table 6 we examine the specifications with the change in hedge fund ownership and the change in non-hedge fund ownership as dependent variables, respectively, and test whether there is a difference in the coefficients on lagged idiosyncratic volatility between hedge funds and non-hedge funds. For under-valued stocks, idiosyncratic volatility is positively and significantly associated with the change in hedge fund ownership with a t-statistic of 2.17, and a one standard deviation shock in idiosyncratic volatility is associated with a 0.052 standard deviation increase in the change of hedge fund ownership. By contrast, there is no significant relation between idiosyncratic risk and the change in non-hedge fund ownership.
Do Hedge Funds Reduce Mispricing?
Now we turn to examining the convergence to the security market plane as measured by the change in alpha. Specifically, we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions of the change in alpha from the previous quarter to the current quarter on the previous quarter's stock ownership by both hedge funds and non-hedge funds: 
where ΔAlpha i,t is the change in Alpha from quarter t-1 to t for stock i, IO_HF i,t-1 is the onequarter lagged hedge fund ownership, IO_Non_HF i,t-1 is the lagged non-hedge fund ownership, ΔIO_HF i,t-1 is the change in hedge fund ownership from quarter t-1 to t, and X i,t-1 is a vector of one-quarter lagged stock characteristics.
As in the previous tests, we standardize the dependent and independent variables in each quarter using their respective means and standard deviation, and focus only on positive alpha stocks as define before. If hedge funds explore arbitrage opportunities and their holding or trading (e.g., change in holdings) helps to reduce mispricing and restore equilibrium, we would expect that the coefficient on lagged hedge fund holdings (or lagged change in hedge fund ownership) to be negative and significant. On the other hand, if the primary investment objectives of non-hedge fund institutions (e.g., banks, insurance companies and mutual funds, etc.) is not to arbitrage mispricing, we would expect to see that the coefficient on lagged nonhedge fund holdings (and lagged change in non-hedge fund holdings) insignificant.
The cross-sectional regression results displayed in Table 7 show that one-quarter lagged hedge fund ownership is significantly associated with the reduction in mispricing measure alpha (t-statistic = -4.44). In particular, a one standard deviation increase in hedge fund ownership in the previous quarter leads to a 0.047 standard deviation reduction in alpha from the previous quarter to the current quarter, after stock characteristics are controlled.
A natural question is whether this convergence is due simply to a reversion to the mean. This would be the case, for example, if a high positive alpha were due to a non-recurring, idiosyncratic positive news announcement that attracted institutional purchases. While the intercept of the regression should control for the average reversion effect, there is still a conditional effect due to purchases and deviation from the pricing plane being caused by the same thing. If this conditional reversion to the mean explained the results, we would again expect a negative coefficient on non-hedge fund holding as well. In contrast, we do not observe a significant relationship between lagged ownership by non-hedge funds and changes in the stock mispricing measure. However, we do find that the coefficient on the lagged change in nonhedge fund ownership is negative and significant, although its magnitude is smaller than that of lagged change in hedge fund ownership. This suggests either that non-hedge funds have a similar price impact, or that there is some evidence that the event that caused the deviation (and rebound) to the plane also caused an institutional purchase.
A related test of convergence conditional on hedge fund purchases is whether there is a subsequent reduction in idiosyncratic risk conditional on hedge fund ownership share. To test this we run a Fama-MacBeth regression similar to (7) 
where ΔIdioRisk i,t is the change in daily idiosyncratic volatility for stock i from quarter t-1 to t, IO_HF i, t-1 is the one-quarter lagged hedge fund ownership, IO_Non_HF i, t-1 is the one-quarter lagged non-hedge fund ownership, ΔIO_HF i,t-1 is the change in hedge fund ownership from quarter t-1 to t, and X i,t-1 is a vector of one-quarter lagged stock characteristics. Table 8 presents the regression results. The coefficient on lagged hedge fund ownership is negative and significant (t-statistic = -3.02), which suggests that hedge fund holding is associated with a reduction in the idiosyncratic volatility of under-valued stocks. The coefficient on non-hedge fund ownership is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.53) after controlling for stock characteristics, again consistent with an explanation of a jointly determined deviation from the pricing plane and purchase decision by institutions.
In another specification, we replace hedge fund holdings by the change in hedge fund holdings, and find that the coefficient on the change in hedge fund holding is negative and significant. Thus, the larger the increase in hedge fund holding, the greater the reduction in idiosyncratic volatility. The sign of the coefficient on the change in non-hedge fund holdings is also negative.
In sum, the results in both Tables 7 and 8 suggest that ownership and changes in ownership by hedge funds, rather than by other types of institutional investors, is associated with a reduction in mispricing and idiosyncratic volatility. At the very least, this suggests that hedge funds, and to some extent other institutions, are exploiting a pattern of reversion to the pricing plane following a deviation. This finding is also consistent with hedge funds playing a positive role in reducing mispricing and improving market efficiency. We find no evidence that hedge fund purchases of these stocks -or purchases by other institutional investors -amplify mispricing.
Price Changes and Hedge Fund Holdings
So far we have examined the sample of undervalued stocks with positive and significant alphas. We now use the full sample of stocks with 13F holding data to answer a more fundamental question of whether hedge fund holdings and purchases are prospectively informative about stock returns.
To answer this question, we perform the following Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly future stock returns on hedge fund ownership and the changes in hedge fund ownership, and we consider two holding periods: one and two quarters. For comparison purposes, we perform the same tests using the fraction of non-hedge fund ownership and the changes in fraction of non-hedge funds ownership as explanatory variables. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
where r i,t+m is the quarterly return on stock i over the horizon of the next m quarters, IO_HF i,t-1 is the hedge fund ownership in quarter t-1, and ΔIO_HF i,t-1 is the change in hedge fund ownership from quarter t-1 to t. The other two variables for non-hedge fund ownership are defined similarly.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results. The level of hedge fund ownership is not significantly related to future stock returns, nor is the level of non-hedge fund ownership. There is some evidence that changes in hedge fund holdings predict future stock returns over a horizon of one quarter. For example, at the one quarter horizon the coefficient on the change in hedge fund ownership is significant, with a t-statistic of 3.31 (see model (2)). In unreported tests, we do not standardize returns and we re-estimate equation (9). The coefficients from this specification can be interpreted directly. We find that a one standard deviation shock to the change in hedge fund ownership leads to a 25 bp increase in the next quarter return (or, one percent per year). When the holding period is two quarters, the coefficient on the change in hedge fund ownership is not significant (see models (3) and (4) in Panel A).
These results are consistent with limits to arbitrage theories which predict less-thanimmediate convergence, and profitability of arbitrage in expectations -as predicted by costly arbitrage models such as Grossman & Stiglitz (1976) . The lack of return predictability at horizons longer than one quarter is consistent with the funding risk necessitating timely convergence. We do not find a similar result for non-hedge fund holdings or the change in nonhedge fund holdings; the changes in their stock holdings bear no relationship to subsequent stock returns. When the investment horizon is beyond two quarters, the unreported results show that the change in hedge fund holdings is not significant and no longer informative about future returns.
One question is whether we are simply picking up the tendency of hedge funds to buy momentum stocks. To address this concern, we add lagged one-, two-, three-and four-quarter returns in equation (9) and report results in Panel B of Table 9 . Indeed, lagged returns up to three quarters are positive and significant, suggesting evidence of momentum up to nine months.
After controlling for the momentum effect, the coefficient on the changes in hedge fund holdings is still positive and significant (t-statistic=2.68). Thus, the cross-sectional predictability of the changes in hedge fund holdings remains significant up to one quarter.
A recent study by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang (2010) documents that confidential holdings of hedge funds exhibit superior performance up to the typical confidential period of twelve months. Our results suggest that the information content of hedge fund holdings in 13F is short-lived, in that the return predictability only lasts for about one quarter and becomes insignificant for longer horizons.
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) show that mutual fund trading (but not their holdings) has predictive power for the stock returns, whereas Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that the trading of all institutions does not predict future returns. Recently, Griffin and Xu (2009) compare return predictability between mutual fund ownership and hedge fund ownership.
They find that, without controlling for previous stock returns, changes in hedge fund ownership are associated with higher future stock returns in the cross-section, whereas return predictability is weaker for mutual fund holdings. However, after past stock returns are controlled for in the cross-sectional regression, they find such predictability disappeared. In our sample, the predictability is robust to past returns.
In sum, we find evidence that changes in hedge fund ownership significantly predict stock returns in the cross-section up to one quarter, a pattern that is not true for non-hedge fund institutional share of ownership. This is consistent with profitability in hedge fund trades before accounting for transactions and information costs.
Stock Illiquidity and Under-Valuation Measures
Some stocks listed on organized exchanges are traded infrequently and may have zero returns and zero volume on some days. This introduces into the Fama-French-Carhart model the econometric problem of errors in variables. According to Scholes and Williams (1977) , stocks trading very infrequently have ordinary least squares estimators asymmetrically biased upward for alphas and downward for betas.
One important question is, if an estimated alpha from the Fama-French-Carhart model is biased because the stock is illiquid and zero returns are included in the estimation of alpha, does it affect our results reported in previous sections? In addition, extant literature has shown that liquidity is important for asset pricing and illiquid stocks trade at low prices relative to their expected cash flows. In the absence of a liquidity risk factor in an equilibrium model, the liquidity risk premium can also be translated into a positive alpha.
One way to address this concern is to include a daily liquidity risk factor in the FamaFrench-Carhart model and to control for a liquidity risk premium explicitly when estimating alpha. Unfortunately, this approach is hindered by several difficulties. The construction of a daily liquidity risk factor requires daily measures of liquidity at the firm level. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001, 2004) calculate daily measures of liquidity as quoted and effective bidask spreads using intraday trade and quote data. However, the detailed microstructure data does not go back to the beginning of our sample period of 1981. Next, the Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure captures liquidity associated with temporary price fluctuations induced by order flow, which can be interpreted as volume-related price reversals attributable to liquidity effects. The measure can be estimated by regressing daily stock return on daily signed trading volume. Unfortunately, the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity measure can only be computed at the monthly frequency. Amihud (2002) measures stock illiquidity as the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume. This measure can be interpreted as the daily price impact of an order flow. However, this measure requires positive volume on each day for each firm, a problem particularly acute for illiquid stocks.
We address the above-mentioned concern in two ways. In the first test, we use the method described below to assess the impact of zero-return days on alpha. For each stock and in each quarter, we identify days with zero return and zero volume. Assume that the return on stock ABC is zero on day ι, ι+1,……ι+k-1, and is non-zero on day ι+k (k > 1). We drop daily stock returns and observations of the Fama-French risk factors on day ι, ι+1, …… ι+k-1, replace stock return on day ι+k by the average stock return over the interval [ι, ι+k] and replace values of the Fama-French factors on day ι+k by their respective averages during [ι, ι+k] . We then use newly constructed daily stock returns and risk factors to re-estimate alpha and its standard error.
We use generalized least squares (GLS) instead of OLS because the error structure is no longer homogeneous.
Comparing two sets of estimated alphas, we find a large overlap between the sample of undervalued stocks used in the previous sections and the sample of undervalued stocks after we control for zero-return days without trading volume. Among all firm-quarter observations with positive and significant alphas that are used in previous sections, 98% still have positive and significant alphas and are still undervalued when we use GLS to address the concern that including zero-return days in the estimation may bias a stock's alpha. Tables 3-6 . Models (1) and (2) show that, after controlling for zero-returns in the estimation of alphas, there is still a positive and significant association between hedge fund ownership and lagged alpha (t-statistic = 6.04) in the cross-section of undervalued stocks, but the relationship between ownership of non-hedge fund institutions and lagged alphas is insignificant. Turning to models (3) and (4), we find that hedge fund ownership is positively and significantly related to the lagged idiosyncratic volatility, but such a relationship is not significant for non-hedge fund institutions.
In models (5) - (8) of Table 10 , we use changes in hedge fund ownership and changes in non-hedge fund ownership as dependent variables. For undervalued stocks, the Fama-MacBeath regression coefficient on lagged alpha is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.48) when regressing changes in hedge fund ownership on lagged alpha. The coefficient on the lagged idiosyncratic volatility is also significant with a t-statistic of 2.01 when regressing changes in hedge fund ownership on the lagged idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast, the coefficients on lagged alpha and lagged idiosyncratic volatility are insignificant when the dependent variable is changes in non-hedge fund ownerships.
We repeat tests in Tables 8-9 , controlling for zero-return observations in the estimation of alpha. For IO_HF and ΔIO_HF, we find qualitatively identical results in Table 11 as in Tables 8   and 9 . The coefficients on IO-HF and ΔIO_HF are negative and significant at the 5% level. The results for IO_Non_HF and ΔIO_Non_HF are also similar to those in Tables 8-9. In the second test, we address the concern of non-synchronous trading by including lagged factors in the Fama-French-Carhart model. We perform this test in the spirit of Scholes and Williams (1977) , estimate the following regression model and obtain alpha for each stock in each quarter using the following model:
In unreported tables, we repeat the experiment in Tables 3-8, using alphas from equation (9) and corresponding undervalued stocks. The results overwhelmingly indicate that our findings reported in Tables 3-8 are robust, even after we take non-synchronous trading into account when estimating alphas.
Overall, we see that controlling for zero-return and zero-volume days in estimating Alphas or controlling for non-synchronous trading in the spirit of Scholes and Williams (1997) does not alter our conclusion. Our findings in Sections 4.1-4.6 are not driven by undervalued stocks with zero-return and zero-volume days.
Conclusion
In this paper we use hand-collected data on hedge fund ownership that covers virtually all hedge fund management companies from 1981 to 2009 in order to understand the role of hedge funds in the price formation process of equity markets.
Our empirical results show that under-valuation, as defined by positive deviations from the security market plane using a standard factor model is positively related to hedge fund holdings, but not non-hedge fund ownership, in the cross-section. Hedge funds hold a proportionately greater amount of under-priced stocks vs. overpriced stocks compared to non-hedge funds. This basic finding is consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds use factor models to identify investment opportunities. This may not be completely surprising given the prevalence of factor models in the investment industry however it has not previously been documented. Khandani and Lo (2011) have shown that the "Quant Meltdown" of August 2007 was consistent with hedge funds taking long-short positions above and below the security market plane defined using standard factor models, including a book-to-market factor. Our analysis suggests that this hedge fund strategy was not confined to that event, but has been common over many years. In fact, neo-classical asset pricing models predict exactly such behavior. In an economy in which there are a few widespread factors, but sufficient frictions to cause deviations from the pricing plane, some set of agents with a comparative informational or operational advantage will exploit the deviation by buying "under-valued" securities. Our empirical results suggest that hedge funds may play that role in the U.S. equity market.
Or research also addresses the current debate about the interpretation of idiosyncratic risk with respect to market efficiency. If high idiosyncratic risk is a measure of the degree to which value-relevant information is impounded in prices, then such stocks would be unattractive to investors seeking to exploit mispricing. On the other hand, if high idiosyncratic risk is indicative of behavioral bias if the marginal investor or of opaque or misleading financial statements, this would potentially attract arbitrageurs. We find that the idiosyncratic volatility of under-valued stocks is positively related to hedge fund holdings, consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds perceive these stocks as inefficiently priced. We also document that the measure of stock under-valuation is positively related to an increase in the hedge fund ownership, We next turn to the consequences of hedge fund ownership and purchases of underpriced stocks. We examine the change in mispricing and idiosyncratic risk in the quarters following an observation of high hedge fund holdings or a positive change in hedge fund holdings. We find a negative relationship -i.e. the larger the hedge fund holdings, the larger the reduction in mispricing in the following quarter. This is true for idiosyncratic volatility as well. We also examine a more general question of whether hedge fund holdings or the changes in hedge fund holdings predict performance of stocks and find that a positive change in hedge fund ownership is informative about future stock returns. That is, an increase in hedge fund ownership in stocks predicts positive future stock returns up to one quarter.
In sum, the holdings data from government filings allow us examine the role of a major class of institutional investor whose broad intent is to generate positive risk adjusted returns. For hedge funds trading U.S. equities, this implies a positive alpha with respect to standard asset pricing models. Hedge funds appear to pursue a strategy of buying undervalued stocks as measured by standard models, and their holdings and purchases in these stocks predict future price adjustments towards the security market plane. 00% 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 and non-hedge-fund ownership (ΔIO_Non_HF t-1 ). The control variables are lagged stock characteristics including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, share price, and a dummy variable indicating S&P 500 index membership. In quarter t, the idiosyncratic risk is the Fama-FrenchCarhart based idiosyncratic return standard deviation and is estimated by using each stock's daily returns in quarter t. For a stock to be included in the analysis in quarter t, we require its t-statistic associated with the lagged Alpha equal to and greater than 1.65 in quarter t-1 (e.g., the stock is under-valued in quarter t-1 as judged by the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model). The dependent and independent variables are standardized each quarter, using their respective means and standard deviations. Tables 5, 6 , 7 and 8 with stock Alphas and idiosyncratic volatility estimated based on the generalized-leastsquare (GLS) method. We control for zero-return, zero-volume days when estimating Alphas and idiosyncratic volatility. Tables 10 and 11 with stock Alphas and idiosyncratic volatility estimated based on the generalized-least-square (GLS) method. We control for zero-return, zero-volume days when estimating Alphas and idiosyncratic volatility.
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